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Deitrich: Florida's Wrongful Death Law: Time for a Change
LEGISLATION
FLORIDA'S WRONGFUL DEATH LAW: TIME FOR
A CHANGE
At common law there was no remedy for wrongful death. This
rule was set out by Lord Ellenborough in 1808.1 In England the
common law rule was abrogated by the Fatal Accidents Act of 1846,
better known as Lord Campbell's Act.2 Subsequently, every American jurisdiction has enacted some form of statutory redress for wrongful death; many of the acts have been patterned after the original
Lord Campbell's Act. Unfortunately, most state legislatures have
failed to anticipate fully and to provide for the complex problems
that now surround wrongful death litigation. Florida's two death
acts3 have allowed such injustice and confusion that the Florida
Supreme Court has been prompted to plead for legislative revision#
but thus far no response has been forthcoming.5 Some of the problems arise because Florida has two death acts and a survival statute. 6
This note will attempt to illustrate the problems, analyze possible
solutions, and recommend what is believed to be the best course of
action.
THE FLORIDA POSITION

Mechanics. Florida has three acts that come under consideration
when there is a wrongful death. The survival statute provides that
a cause of action shall not abate because of the death of the injured
person. The right to sue, on behalf of the estate, is continued in the
decedent's personal representative.
Florida's version of Lord Campbell's Act provides a new cause of
action for the injuries sustained by the survivors of the decedent as
a result of his death.7 The act establishes a hierarchy of beneficiary
classes: (1) the surviving spouse; (2) minor children; (3) other dependents; and (4) the decedent's estate. The right to bring the action
vests exclusively in the class of highest priority. Members of a lower
class cannot bring suit, even though the action is not prosecuted by
the ranking class; 8 only the class bringing suit may recover for its
1. Baker v. Bolton, I Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
2. 9 & 10 Vict. (1846).

3.

FLA. STAT.

§§768.01-.03 (1965).

4. Ellis v. Brown, 77 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1955).
5. In 1957 a bill to amend §768.02 was introduced, but died in committee. For
a discussion of the proposal see Alpert, The FloridaDeath Acts, 10 U. FLA. L. REv.

153 (1957).
FA. STAT. §45.11 (1965).
7. Shiver v. Sessions, 80 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1955); Ake v. Birnbaum, 156 Fla.
735, 25 So. 2d 213 (1945).
8. Benoit v. Miami Beach Elec. Co., 85 Fla. 396, 96 So. 158 (1923).
6.
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losses. 9 The right of action cannot be waived or assigned. 10 To
qualify as a plaintiff, a member of a subordinate class must allege
and show the nonexistence of any members of a class of higher
priority.Under Florida's third statute, the Wrongful Death of Minors
Act,' 2 a separate suit may be maintained by the father of a deceased
minor; if the father is dead, the child's mother may bring the action.
Generally, the various suits are not joined; it has been held, however,
that when a minor's father brings suit as administrator in a regular
wrongful death action and in his own right in the special action, the
13
suits may be joined.
Damages. Under the survival statute damages are limited to compensation for injuries suffered by the decedent prior to his death.
The elements compensable are primarily the decedent's pain and
suffering, loss of earnings, and the hospital and medical expenses
occasioned by the injury.
The measure of damages in the wrongful death action'14 depends
upon which beneficiary class brings suit. When the plaintiff is the
surviving spouse, minor child, or other dependent of the decedent,
damages are based on the so-called "loss to survivors theory." In
general, recovery is confined to the pecuniary losses of the plaintiff. 15
The primary element is frequently the loss of the financial support
to be furnished by the decedent had he lived. If suit is brought by
the surviving spouse, recovery is allowed for the loss of the services
of the decedent,16 for the loss of the comfort, protection, society and
companionship of the decedent, 17 and consortium.' 8 When the action
9. Citrola v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 264 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1959). Indirect
recovery is possible, however; it has been held that the existence and number of
minor children is a proper consideration in assessing the damages to a widow,
Director Gen. of R.Rs. v. Into, 83 Fla. 377, 91 So. 269 (1922).
10. Clar v. Dade County, 116 So. 2d 34 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
11. Kasanof v. Embry-Riddle Co., 157 Fla. 677, 26 So. 2d 889 (1946).
12. FLA. STAT. §768.03 (1965).

13. Callison v. Brake, 129 Fed. 196 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 194 U.S. 638 (1904).
14. For an economic analysis of the measure of damages in wrongful death
actions, see Lassiter, Estimating the Monetary Value of Damages in Negligence
Cases Involving Death, 15 U. FLA. L. REv. 384 (1962).
15. W. B. Harbeson Lumber Co. v. Anderson, 102 Fla. 731, 136 So. 557 (1931).
16. Lithgow v. Hamilton, 69 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1954); Frazier v. Ewell Eng'r &
Contracting Co., 62 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 1952); Southern Util. Co. v. Davis, 83 Fla. 366,
92 So. 683 (1922).
17. Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Martin, 56 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 1952); Dina v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 90 Fla. 558, 106 So. 416 (1925); Southern Util. Co. v. Davis,
note 16 supra; Bowie v. Reynolds, 161 So. 2d 882 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
18. Lithgow v. Hamilton, 69 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1954); Bowie v. Reynolds, note
17 supra.
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is brought by the minor children, there may be recovery for the loss
of attention, care, companionship, comfort, protection, and educational and moral training. 19 If the plaintiff is a dependent not of the
support.20
first two classes, recovery is limited to the lost financial
21
Mental anguish of a survivor is not compensable.
There is a marked contrast in the damages allowed when the
action is maintained by the personal representative on behalf of the
estate. The theory changes to the loss of estate concept, under which
the estate recovers the "savings" 22 that the decedent might have ac23
cumulated had he survived.
The Wrongful Death of Minors Act authorizes a separate suit by
the father of a deceased minor child for recovery of the parents'
mental anguish and the loss of any earnings that the child might have
acquired prior to his majority. This is the only statute that defines
recoverable damages.
THE PROBLEM

Mechanics. The priority of beneficiaries under Florida's death
act causes a major problem that can best be illustrated in an example.
A, a man forty years old, is killed in an accident caused by the negligence of D. A had a wife and two minor children; A's mother was
also dependent upon him for support. Under Florida law, the widow
has the exclusive right to bring suit against D for A's wrongful death.
Although it has been held that the court may consider the existence
of children in determining the widow's damages, 2 4 A's widow nevertheless recovers in her own right and not as a representative. 25 It is
apparent that the children and dependent mother are without a
remedy for their losses. The mere existence of the spouse effectively

19. Piddock-Jones Co. v. Watson, 141 Fla. 376, 193 So. 05 (1940); Triay v.
Seals, 92 Fla. 310, 109 So. 427 (1926).
20. Duval v. Hunt, 34 Fla. 85, 15 So. 876 (1894).
21. St. Johns Elec. Co. v. Lawler, 90 Fla. 188, 105 So. 818 (1925).
22. "Savings" is used here to mean the accumulations or "excess of decedent's
gross earnings over his gross expenses for all purposes except the enrichment of his
estate." See APPENDIX, §5. See also Alpert, The Florida Death Acts, 10 U. FLA.
L. REV. 153 (1957) for a discussion of Florida's confusion of this loss to estate and
the more common loss of estate.
23. Marianna & Blountstown R.R. v. May, 83 Fla. 524, 91 So. 553 (1922);
Florida E. Coast Ry. v. Hayes, 67 Fla. 101, 64 So. 504 (1914); Jacksonville Elec.
Co. v. Bowden, 54 Fla. 461, 45 So. 755 (1908); Burch v. Gilbert, 148 So. 2d 289
(1st D.C.A. Fla. 1953).
24. Director Gen. of R.Rs. v. Into, 83 Fla. 377, 91 So. 269 (1922).
25. Citrola v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 264 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1959).
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blocks the other survivors from recovery. This problem becomes particularly acute in the following situations: (1) the widow chooses not
to sue and (2) the widow was A's second wife, and the children are
issue of the first marriage.26 In both cases the children are denied recovery through no fault of their own; they cannot even look to the
widow for an indirect participation in the recovery. The dependent
mother is similarly situated. A's estate cannot recover for the lost
savings that A would have accumulated had he lived. The purpose of
the wrongful death act is to provide redress for the losses of the survivors.27 There is no satisfactory explanation why the losses of the
children and mother are to be denied compensation merely because
there is a surviving spouse. Similarly, if it is the policy of the law to
allow the estate to recover its losses, why should such recovery be
permitted only if there are no surviving beneficiaries? Surely the loss
is as real in one instance as in the other.
A further problem is the possible multiplicity of suits. In the
example above, A's personal representative can bring a survival action,
and the widow can maintain the death suit even though liability in
both cases is based on the same tortious act of D. When the decedent
is a minor child, a third action may be prosecuted by the child's
father. The various actions are generally not joined, 28 although
joinder has been permitted when the same person is party plaintiff
in both the wrongful death suit and wrongful death of minors action.29
The inefficiency and duplication of effort is apparent. Even conceding
that each suit is based on the protection of a different interest invaded
by the defendant, there is no sound reason why these interests cannot all be protected in a unified death action.
Damages. With the exception of the Wrongful Death of Minors
Act, no standards for damages have been established by the legislature.
This oversight has caused confusion among both bench and bar and
has permitted many inconsistencies and anomalies in the Florida law.
It is helpful to group the potential damages caused by a death
producing tort into three categories: (A) damages personal to the
decedent; (B) damages consequent upon the decedent's ceasing to
function as an economic source; and (C) damages generated by the
loss of the decedent as a unique individual. In a survival action "A"
and "B" damages can be claimed. "A" damages include compensation
for pain and suffering and medical expenses; "B" damages encompass

26. See Randolph v. Clack, 113 So. 2d 270 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
27. Florida Dairies Co. v. Rogers, 119 Fla. 451, 161 So. 85 (1935); Florida E.
Coast Ry. v. McRoberts, Ill Fla. 278, 149 So. 631 (1933).
28. Latimer v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 285 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1960).

29. Callison v. Brake, 129 Fed. 196 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 194 U.S. 638 (1904).
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recovery for loss of earnings prior to death. Damages under the two
wrongful death acts fall within the "B" and "C" categories.
Again the problems can best be seen in an example. X, a man
twenty years of age, is fatally injured due to the negligence of D.
For simplicity, it is assumed that X's total lifetime earnings, had he
survived, could be expected to be 250,000 dollars when reduced to
present value. Assuming X did not die immediately, his personal
representative can sue in a survival action for X's pain and suffering
and medical expenses ("A" damages), and for lost earnings prior to
death ("B" damages). If X is survived by a wife, she can sue for his
wrongful death and recoved that part of the 250,000 dollars that could
reasonably be expected to have been used to provide her support had
X lived. As previously pointed out, if X had children and/or other
dependents, the portion of the 250,000 dollars they would have received is not recoverable. Similarly, the portion that X would have
accumulated cannot be recovered by his estate. If, however, X left
no beneficiaries, the estate can recover the accumulations he would
have made had he lived. 30 On the other hand, had X survived his
injuries in a state of one hundred per cent impairment of his earning
capacity, he theoretically could have recovered the entire loss of prospective earnings, reduced to present value - 250,000 dollars.31 This
situation has caused the Florida Supreme Court to state that an
anomaly results "in that the wrongdoer will be required to respond
in a less amount of damages if the injured person dies, than if the
injured person survives the injury."32
In the above example, it can be assumed that X's earnings during
his lifetime would have been allocated generally among three recipients: (1) X himself; (2) X's dependents; and (3) X's estate, through
accumulation. Because the amounts that X would have expended in
self-support are not recoverable in a wrongful death action, a rough
assumption is that the remaining amounts would be allocated to his
dependents and his estate in inverse proportions. The priority system,
however, allows but one group of dependents to recover, but if there
are no beneficiaries of the first three classes, X's personal representative can recover the entire loss of estate, which will of course, be large
in the absence of dependents. Thus in many instances "it might be
said that it is cheaper to kill a person who leaves a spouse or child
or other person dependent upon him for support, than it is to kill a
person who is survived by no one in the designated classes."33
30. Cases cited note 23 supra.
31. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Brinson, 67 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 1953); Breeding's
Dania Drug Co. v. Runyon, 147 Fla. 123, 2 So. 2d 376 (1941); German American
Lumber Co. v. Barrett, 66 Fla. 181, 63 So. 661 (1913).
32. Ellis v. Brown, 77 So. 2d 845, 849 (Fla. 1955).
33. Ellis v. Brown, supra note 32, at 849.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1966

5

Law Review,
Vol. 18,
UNIVERSITY Florida
OF FLORIDA
LAW REVIEW

Iss. 4 [1966],
Art. 7
[Vol. XVIII

If, as in the example, X is a minor, a third action is authorized.
Under the usual circumstances a minor would leave no surviving dependents, and the regular wrongful death action would be brought
by his administrator. The amount recovered would pass according
to the laws of intestate succession, and X's parents would take
equally. 3 4 The Wrongful Death of Minors Act authorizes recovery

by the parents for mental anguish and lost earnings prior to majority
presumably because they cannot recover in the regular death action.
This, however, overlooks the fact that the parents are often the ultimate recipients of the fruit of a wrongful death suit by the child's
personal representative. Thus it can be most expensive to kill a
minor upon whom no one is dependent for support.
Obvious inequities appear in Florida law regarding recovery of
burial expenses. A widower can recover his wife's funeral expenses if
he has paid them and claims them as a special element of damages in
the death action, 35 but a widow cannot recover her husband's burial
expenses in either a wrongful death36 or survival action.3 7 There is
also a question whether it is ever desirable to allow funeral expenses
per se because such expenses are not actually caused by the tortfeasor,
but rather are only hastened.
Miscellaneous. Several other questions arise in considering the
wrongful death area. There is no provision regarding whether or not
a viable fetus is a person within the meaning of the death acts. 38
Punitive damages are not allowed in a death suit,39 but the question
has not been decided in a survival action.40 The law on this point
should be clarified. A final point is that creditors are often unprotected when suit is by a named beneficiary. The recovery is not an
asset of the estate unless the personal representative sues as the fourth
class. The extent to which a creditor should participate is a question
worthy of legislative consideration.

34.

FLA. STAT.

§731.23 (1965).

35. Lithgow v. Hamilton, 69 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1954); Potts v. Mulligan, 141
Fla. 685, 193 So. 767 (1940); City of Coral Gables v. Neill, 133 Fla. 4, 182 So. 432
(1938).
36. Saucer v. Willys-Overland, Inc., 49 F.2d 385 (S.D. Fla. 1931) (cited with
approval in Potts v. Mulligan, 141 Fla. 685, 193 So. 767 (1940).
37. Doby v. Griffin, 171 So. 2d 404 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
38. Although this has not arisen in Florida, it is a very real problem. See
Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964) in which recovery was denied for
the wrongful death of a viable fetus.
39. Florida Dairies Co. v. Rogers, 119 Fla. 451, 161 So. 85 (1935); Florida E.
Coast Ry v. McRoberts, 111 Fla. 278, 149 So. 631 (1933).
40. Fowlkes v. Sinnamon, 97 So. 2d 626 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1957).
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The Problem: A Summary. Several major problems appear in
summarizing the Florida law: (1) the priority system of beneficiaries
is unjust insofar as it allows the losses of some survivors to go without
redress; (2) the existence of both survival and death actions arising
from the same tortious act is inefficient and expensive; (3) the authorization of two distinct death suits when the decedent is a minor is unnecessary; (4) the failure of the legislature to specify which damages
are recoverable has caused confusion and complexity; and (5) the
three statutes together permit results inconsistent with the avowed
policy of the law.
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

Many of the existing problems could be solved by an amendment
abolishing the priority of beneficiaries. Such an amendment would
prevent certain problems of recovery and would encourage joinder of
the death and survival actions. This solution, however, would not
cure the problems in determining damages. It is initially suggested
that the present death acts be repealed and a comprehensive statute
be enacted in their place.
Perhaps the most basic system is a suit by the personal representative for the loss to the estate. 41 Loss to the estate is measured by
the decedent's prospective gross earnings less his personal living expenses. The recovery would be administered in a fund apart from
the assets of the estate and would pass according to the rules of intestate succession. Such a system has the distinct advantage of eliminating troublesome questions of damages. It also is a logical extension of the theory underlying recovery in a personal injury suit in
which the plaintiff is suing for impairment of his earning capacity.
Because the suit is by the representative it could easily be joined with
a survival action, thus eliminating problems of waste and inefficiency.
Such a system is not without difficulties. First, it is not designed
to effect a recovery reflective of the actual losses suffered by the decedent's survivors. This is not as serious as one might think; as a
practical matter, the takers under the intestate rules are quite often
the very survivors who have suffered the loss. The apportionment,
however, does not depend on a showing of actual loss, and it is still
possible for a dependent to be denied recovery because of the builtin priority system of the intestate laws. Second, such a wrongful
death law fails to recognize damages due to the loss of the decedent
as a unique individual. The family of a decedent suffers serious
41. Similar procedures are found in, e.g., Connecticut, Kentucky, and Rhode
Island.
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losses, such as services, companionship, and guidance of the decedent,
that are not compensable under the loss to estate theory. A basic
policy decision is whether the law is to protect these interests, many
of them sentimental. Third, under loss to estate the recovery is
administered in a separate fund and is not available for the debts of
the decedent. Here again is a policy consideration: Do we want to
favor the decedent's heirs to the complete exclusion of creditors? The
problem is particularly acute when the heirs are distant relatives who
have suffered little or no actual loss because of the decedent's death.
Fourth, this solution lends itself to some of the largest recoveries when
the decedent is a child or very young unmarried man; yet this is the
very situation in which most of the losses suffered are of a sentimental
nature because there quite probably is no one dependent upon the
decedent for support. Do we want to allow such large recoveries for
sentimental losses, even though the recovery is disguised as a loss to
estate?
The second generally accepted theory of damages in a death action
is loss to survivors. Although this theory is embodied in the laws of
the majority of American jurisdictions,42 there is no uniformity as to
which losses to survivors are compensable. The obvious difficulty
under this theory is that the measure of damages becomes quite complex. Furthermore, the problems of how the suit is to be maintained,
joinder, and the classification of beneficiaries arise again. Also, under
a typical loss to survivors statute, creditors are not adequately protected. These problems, however, can be solved by drafting a comprehensive death act.
Professor McCormick notes that in preparing a wrongful death act,
one of the first considerations is whether to allow two causes of action
to be brought, that is both a survival and a wrongful death action. 4 3
Notwithstanding that the concept of the nonabatement of tort actions
has become well established in our legal thinking, when the remedy
for wrongful death was enacted, there was a natural separation of the
two actions. It is suggested, however, that when the tort ultimately
results in the death of the injured person, a merger of the survival
and death actions is more practical. If the survival action is an asset
of the estate it can just as easily be enforced by the plaintiff of the
death suit as a claim on behalf of the estate. This raises the question
of who should prosecute a death suit, the presonal representative or
one of the surviving beneficiaries, as is now the case in Florida. If it
is assumed that all beneficiaries should be allowed to participate in
any recovery, it becomes apparent that the personal representative is
the most logical plaintiff. He can recover as representative of any or
42.
43.

PROSSER, TORTS §121 (3d ed. 1964).
McCoRMICK, DAMAGES §106 (1935).
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all beneficiaries and of the estate. If a beneficiary is plaintiff, some
sort of priority must be established to determine which beneficiary
can sue. To avoid the problem of blocking those of a lower priority,
there must be a procedure whereby secondary beneficiaries can acquire
the right to sue if the beneficiary does not prosecute. The simplest
and most direct procedure is to give the decedent's personal representative the right to sue on behalf of all interests.
A further question is whether there should be any recovery by
the estate when there are surviving beneficiaries; Florida does not
allow such recovery, the priority system favoring survivors to the exclusion of the estate. Presumably, however, a loss to the estate exists
regardless whether there are other beneficiaries. Because the Florida
law already recognizes that definite losses do occur,44 it would seem
entirely proper to classify the estate as merely another beneficiary.
Such a provision would also solve the problem of creditor protection
inasmuch as a recovery by the estate would be an ordinary asset subject to the debts of the decedent.
What is suggested by this discussion is a single suit by the personal
representative for the use and benefit of named survivors and the
estate; damages that each beneficiary could claim would be specifically
set out. Such an act has been drafted by David Anderson in the
HarvardJournal on Legislation.4 5 The Harvard Model Act does not,
however, give the right to sue to the personal representative, but establishes a priority system among the beneficiaries with a provision
allowing secondary beneficiaries to sue upon notice to the primary
beneficiary.
The practical effects of the Model Act can best be seen by an example. It will be assumed that the act has been amended to provide
that the personal representative is the plaintiff and can recover on
behalf of all beneficial interests. X is twenty years old, married, and
the father of two small children. He also supports his widowed
mother. X is fatally injured because of D's negligence. Under
the Model Act, as amended, X's executor could maintain a single
suit for the benefit of all named beneficiaries. Each of the survivors could recover the lost contributions to support, and the
estate could recover the "savings" that X would have accumulated
during his lifetime had he survived. X's wife can recover for the loss
of his household services, and the children can recover for the loss
44. For example, a widow can recover her dower expectancy from the decedent's
estate in a wrongful death suit. Frazier v. Ewell Eng'r & Contracting Co., 62 So. 2d
51 (Fla. 1952). This recognizes by implication that there are compensable injuries
suffered because there is a loss to the estate.
45. Anderson, A Model State Wrongful Death Act, 1 HARV. J. LEGISLATION 28
(1964). See APPENDIX.
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of their father's instruction and guidance. 46 In addition, X's widow
and children can recover for lost companionship, affection, and protection.47 Medical expenses, formerly an element of damages in a
survival action, can be claimed by any survivor who has paid them,
or by the estate if the expenses have been charged to the estate.
Adopting the reasoning of the Iowa courts48 that the tort-feasor has

not caused the burial expense, but has merely hastened it, the act allows recovery only of interest on the expense measured by the normal
life expectancy of X. Here again the award is made to the survivor
who has incurred the expense or to the estate; the recovery may not
exceed the actual expenditures for the funeral. A final item recoverable by the plaintiff is his attorney's reasonable fee.
Several features of the act stand out:
(1) The pain and suffering of the decedent are not compensable. This is not so surprising when it is remembered that the
purpose of the act is to provide redress to survivors for the losses
resulting from the decedent's death. "[I]t is time that the fact is
accepted that the dead are beyond compensation by earthly
awards. The task of the law is confined to solacing the living, not
by reference to what the dead might or might not have suffered
but by reference to what the living certainly have suffered." 49
(2) The act provides recovery only for actual losses suffered.
This can easily be seen in the method of recovery of medical and
funeral expenses.
(3) The act recognizes that damages of a nonfinancial nature
result from death and provides that these may be recovered, even
when the decedent has recovered the financial loss in a personal
injury action prior to his death.
(4) The act anticipates many questions that plague present
wrongful death legislation: the death of a viable fetus, punitive
damages, death of a survivor prior to judgment, and the protection of minor children from poor or negligent financial management by the spouse.
(5) The recovery of attorney's fees is permitted. This provision appears highly desirable; when a family's very financial
46. One of the two alternatives sets a limit of $1,500 per year per child until
the child reaches eighteen years of age. The second alternative sets no such
limitation on recovery.

47. Here a $5,000 limitation is imposed. If, however, no damages are sought
for loss of support, services, and a father's instruction the limit is $10,000. All
beneficiaries eligible to claim under this section share the limited recovery.
48. Van Wie v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Iowa 1948); Brady v. Haw,

187 Iowa 501, 174 N.W. 331 (1919).
49. 107 SOL. J. 324, 326 (1963).
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existence is shattered by a tort-feasor's act it is an unwarranted
burden to require the family's recovery to be depleted by legal
fees.
The act is not without problems, however. As previously noted
the personal representative should maintain the suit. Furthermore,
the practice of setting dollar limitations on recovery under certain
sections is questionable. 50 This problem could be remedied by providing that these amounts be automatically re-evaluated every five
years by reference to a predetermined standard, such as the purchasing power of the dollar or cost of living index. There also appears to be an excessive recovery permitted for the loss of a father's
guidance. This could be a loophole for unwarranted awards. A
lower ceiling would be advisable.
CONCLUSION

The loss to estate theory has the virtue of simplicity and the vice
of a recovery unrelated to actual loss. The better solution appears
to be enactment of the Model Act with the minor changes recommended. Adoption of the Model Act would solve the major problems
now existent. First, the priority system of beneficiaries would no
longer exist, thus ending recovery by one class to the exclusion of
others. Second, the survival and death actions are combined, eliminating the duplication of effort. Third, there would be no need for
a separate death suit for the death of a minor; parents are included
among the beneficiaries and can recover in the regular suit. Fourth,
damages are specified in mandatory guidelines. Fifth, the act provides
for compensation of actual losses suffered by the survivors and the
estate.
The Florida law of wrongful death is a nightmare of confusion
and contradiction. "The truly appalling situation in Florida arising
out of our Death Acts cannot be overemphasized. The grief, misery
and travail, loss and destitution are unnecessary. The Death Acts
must be changed."-51 Is it not time that the ten year old plea of the
Florida Supreme Court for aid be answered?
DAvm K.

DEITRICH

50. See notes 46, 47 supra.
51. Alpert, The Florida Death Acts, 10 U. FA. L. Rzv. 153, 182 (1957).
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APPENDIX
PROPOSAL FOR A MODEL STATE WRONGFUL DEATH AcT*

SECTION 1. Declarationof Policy.
It is the policy of this state that the loss that results when wrongful death
occurs should be shifted from the survivors of the decedent to the wrongdoer.
It is recognized that wrongful death, in addition to depriving survivors of the
support and services of the deceased, injures other relationships by depriving the
survivors of the decedent's affection, companionship and protection. This act
creates a cause of action to compensate survivors for both these tangible and intangible injuries and provides mandatory guidelines for computing awards.
The cause of action provided is intended to be remedial, not punitive, in nature. For this reason no punitive damages may be granted in an action provided
by this act.
The provisions of this act shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment
of the above purposes.
SECTION 2. Definitions.

(A) Contributions for support. The term "support"embraces payments to a
survivor for non-essentials as well as payments for necessaries, and includes contributions in kind of farm or home produced goods or produce, as well as money
contributions.
(B) Earnings. "Earnings" as used in section 5 shall include salary, business income, pension benefits and income from life estates, but does not include income
from investments, royalties and the like that will continue after the decedent's
death.
(C) Survivors. The "survivors" of a decedent shall include the spouse, minor
child or children, parent of a minor child, illegitimate children who are wholly
or partly dependent on the deceased for support, parent of an illegitimate child
who makes substantial contributions to the child's support, and any other blood
or legal relative wholly or partly dependent on the deceased for support or services.
SECTION 3. Liability for wrongful death.
Whenever death is caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, the decedent's
survivors may maintain an action in damages for the injuries sustained because of
the death against the person or corporation responsible for the death.
If there are no survivors, the action may be maintained by the decedent's estate.
The wrongdoer's personal representative shall be the party defendant in the
event of the wrongdoer's death either before or after the action is commenced.
SECTION 4. Parties entitled to bring action; joinder; statutes of limitations.
(A) The action shall be brought by the decedent's survivors in the following
order of preference:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

by the surviving spouse,
by the oldest surviving unmarried minor child,
by the father - in the event of the death of an unmarried minor child,
by the mother, in the event of the death of an unmarried minor child,
if the father is dead or has deserted,
(5) by any other blood or legal relative wholly or partly dependent on the
decedent;
*Used by permission. Copyright

1964 by the Harvard Student Legislative Re-

search Bureau. [Reprinted in the original form appearing in I Har. J. Legislation
31 (1964).]
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provided, that regardless of which of the foregoing beneficiaries bring the action,
it shall be for the use and benefit of all potential beneficiaries enumerated in this
subsection.
Such beneficiaries must be named and described in the plaintiff's pleadings in
order to have their losses considered as elements of damage.
A beneficiary shall not be disqualified because he is not a citizen or resident of
the United States.
(B) Failure of the preferred plaintiff to bring the action within 30 days of a
written request to do so made by another beneficiary shall entitle the party next in
order to bring the suit; provided, that in the last 30 days allowed for bringing
such an action any beneficiary may institute the action.
(C) If none of the foregoing survive the decedent or institute the action, the
action may be brought by and in the name of the personal representative of the
deceased.
(D) There shall be only one recovery under this chapter, and if separate suits
are brought to recover damages for wrongful death of the same decedent, the
suits may be joined on the motion of any party, beneficiary or by the court having
jurisdiction.
(E) An action under this chapter must be brought within two years of the
death of the deceased.
SECTION 5. Elements of damage.
Within the limitations stated, the trier may give such damages as it deems
fair and just for the following injuries resulting from the wrongful death to the
survivors and/or the estate.
(A) Lost contributions for support. Any person enumerated in section 4(A)
is entitled to recover for lost contributions to his support resulting from the
wrongful death, as follows:
(1) Past losses: The full value, plus interest, of lost contributions to support, from the time of the injury causing the wrongful death, to the
time of judgment.
(2) Future losses: The present value of future support payments. In computing the amount of such losses, the trier shall consider that the total
amount the decedent would have had available annually for all support
contributions would have been his gross earnings, adjusted for likely
increases and decreases over his working life expectancy, less such fixed
expenses as taxes and personal maintenance. In fixing a survivor's share
of the total amount available, the court shall consider the survivor's
place in the decedent's household and/or his relation to the decedent.
In computing the duration of such future losses, the trier shall be guided by
the joint life expectancies of the decedent and the survivor, the working life expectancy of the decedent, and the fact that the obligation to support a healthy
child ends upon the child's attaining his majority, graduation from college, marriage
or leaving home.
The present value of the recovery for future lost support (and services -see
section 5 (B)) shall be determined by multiplying the amount the survivor could
reasonably expect to receive annually times the years of his expectancy. The resulting sum shall then be discounted at an interest rate which the average untrained investor might obtain on the principal. Having reduced this sum to its
present value, the trier shall then add an amount to compensate the survivor for
income taxes the survivor will have to pay on the interest earned by his share of
the recovery.
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(B) Lost services. In the event of the wrongful death of husband or wife,
the surviving spouse may recover an amount equal to the cost of hiring help to
perform the household services customarily performed by the decedent. In addition, in the event of the wrongful death of the mother, the father, or if the
father is dead or deserted, the oldest child under 18 years of age, may recover an
amount equal to the reasonable cost of hiring a woman of the mother's general
educational and domestic ability to live in the home and care for the children
until the youngest is 18 years old. In the event of the wrongful death of any
other person, the survivor may recover the value of the cost of hiring help to perform the household services customarily performed by the deceased for the survivor.
The award for services rendered up to the time of the trial shall be an amount
equal to the sum paid or owed by the survivor for such services, plus interest.
The award for the future loss of services shall be the present value of the cost of
such services for the likely duration of such services to be computed by the process
specified by section 5 (A) (2).
(C) Loss of father's instruction and guidance. In recognition of the fact that
most fathers provide training and guidance for their children, the mother, or, if
none, the oldest child under 18, may recover up to $1,500 a year, per child, to
age 18, for such partial substitutes as tutorial services, driving lessons, summer
camping trips and the like provide. The amount of the award shall be computed
in the same manner as an award for lost services.
(Alternative)
[ (C) Loss of father's instruction and guidance. In recognition of the fact that
most fathers provide training and guidance for their children, the mother, or,
if none, the oldest child under 18, may recover an amount equal to the cost of
hiring a part-time male teacher to provide such general training and guidance as
he would expect a father to provide his children. The amount of the award shall
be computed in the same manner as an award for lost services, provided, that
where no such teacher is available, an equivalent sum may be recovered to pay
for such partial substitutes for the lost father as tutorial services, driving lessons,
and summer camping trips and the like provide.]
(D) Death of a viable, unborn child. The mother, or father if the mother
does not survive, may recover all the medical expenses related to her pregnancy
and to its termination when the termination is caused by the wrongful death of
a viable, unborn child.
In addition, the plaintiff may recover not more than an additional $1,000, in
lieu of damages under all other subsections of this section except section 5 (G). No
other recovery shall be available for such wrongful death under this chapter.
(E) Lost companionship, affection, and protection. If the decedent was the
spouse, or unmarried minor child of a beneficiary, or the parent of an unmarried
beneficiary under 18 years of age, the jury may award an additional sum not
exceeding $5,000 for the loss of the decedent's companionship, affection and/or
protection where there has also been an award under section 5 (A) (B) or (C), or
a sum not exceeding $10,000 if no damages are sought under sections 5 (A) (B)
or (C). In measuring the extent of such loss, the trier may consider the mental
anguish caused the survivor by the wrongful death. When more than one beneficiary stands in a relation to the decedent described by this subsection, each is
entitled to share in the sum recovered under this section, and the trier may apportion the award as it sees fit.
(Alternative)
[(E) Death of a child. In cases of the death of a child, the parents may elect
to seek recovery under subsections (A) and (B) of this section, or to proceed
under this subsection. If this subsection is elected, the damages shall be that
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amount which would reimburse the parents for the reasonable cost of raising
the child to the time of this death.]
(F) Expenses of last illness and burial. Any survivor who has paid for any
reasonable medical or hospital bill in connection with injuries causing the wrongful death may recover these payments, plus interest. There shall be a presumption
that bills actually paid are reasonable.
Any survivor who has paid for any reasonable funeral or burial expense of
the deceased may recover an amount equal to reasonable interest on such expense
for a period measured by the normal life expectancy of the decedent immediately
prior to his death; but, in no event shall recovery exceed funeral and burial expenses actually paid by the survivor. There shall be a presumption that funeral
and burial expenses actually paid up to $1,500.00 are reasonable.
(G) Reasonable Attorney Fees. In the trier's discretion, the court shall award
the plaintiff his attorney's fee, not to exceed _% [35% suggested] of the first
$10,000 recovered and _% [25% suggested] of any recovery in excess of $10,000
under the other subsections of this section; provided, that such fee shall be the
sole fee payable; and provided further, that no such fee shall be awarded if the
amount recovered does not exceed by 10% the final settlement offer made in
writing by the defendant to the plaintiff within six months of the wrongful death
for the injuries under the other subsections of this section.
(The following subsection is intended for consideration and adoption only in
those states that do not have a comparable provision in effect.)
[(H) Loss to the estate. The plaintiff designated in section 4 or, if none survives, the personal representative of the deceased, may recover on behalf of the
decedent's estate a sum equal to the excess of the decedent's gross earnings over
his gross expenses for all purposes except the enrichment of his estate and payments for child support and/or alimony due under a valid decree. The award for
such losses from the time of the injury causing death to the trial shall be their
full value, plus interest. The award for future losses shall be the present value
of the sum which is equal to such excess multiplied by the years of the decedent's
normal life expectancy.
If the expenses of the decedent's last illness, funeral and burial have become
charges against the estate, they may be recovered by or on behalf of, the personal
representative in the manner specified in section 5 (F).
The total sum so recovered shall be available to satisfy the debts, legacies and
bequests of the estate. Any excess shall be distributed as personalty to the decedent's heirs as if by intestacy.]
SE

ON 6. Lien or trust for benefit of minors.

All or part of any amounts awarded under sections 5 (A) (B) (C) or (E) for
the benefit of a minor child or children may be set aside by the court for the
protection of such children after consideration of the age of such children, the
amount involved, the capacity and integrity of the surviving spouse and any other
facts the court has or may receive. The amount so set aside may be'impressed with
the creation of a lien in favor of such children or otherwise protected as the circumstances may warrant.
SECTION 7. Effect of prioractions or judgments.

The fact that
injuries growing
action created by
judgment by the
or settled within

the decedent during his lifetime instituted an action for his
out of the incident that caused his death shall not bar the
this chapter if the action had not been settled or reduced to
time of his death. If such an action was reduced to judgment
two years before the date of the wrongful death, the survivors
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may bring an action to recover for their loss of maternal or paternal care, companionship, affection and protection as provided by sections 5 (B) (C) and (E) if
no cause of action for these elements of damage arose to the survivors as a result
of the decedent's injuries.
No cause of action shall be granted by this chapter if the deceased's own right
to bring an action for personal injuries lapsed during his lifetime for failure to
prosecute as provided in -----------...----[Fill in number of section providing statute
of limitations in tort actions for personal injuries.]
SECTION 8. Effect of death of a survivor.
The death of a person otherwise entitled to recover under this chapter between
the time of death of the decedent and the time suit is brought, shall not bar his
right to recover, and the right to bring the action shall pass to the person next
entitled. The death of such a person after the wrongful death but before judgment shall have the following effects on his own claim: (A) His share of the recovery under sections 5 (A), (B) and (C) shall be computed by reference to his
date of death, and shall be for the benefit of his estate; (B) such estate shall not
be entitled to recover any amount under section 5 (E), and only such amounts as
would otherwise be due under sections 5 (D), (F) and (G).
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